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As we have searched for family justice in recent years, we have constantly
been reminded of the need to uphold "family values."t This exhortation
post-dates Lord Denning's long judicial tenure, but will resonate with any
student of Lord Denning for his was a voyage to a land where family
justice was imbricated with family values. Lord Denning, we can be sure,
would have joined in the debates on child support and child murderers, on
divorce reform and cohabitation, on transsexualism and homosexuality,
with vigour and vision. On some of these issues his views would have
been predictable: on others less so. Few English judges have had a clearer
world-view and perhaps none has had one in which the family was so
central. This is not to say he held a consistent theory as such either about
the family or the role of family law. And, indeed, there are contradictions:
for example, he professes a belief in women's equality (though on one
famous public occasion he castigated its implications2), yet is responsible
for some notable patriarchal reasoning3 and some overtly sexist rulings.4
Lord Denning is a moral fundamentalist. Moral fundamentalism is part
of the ethos of conservatism.5 It is a world-view firmly located within the
traditional middle-classes. Stuart Hall has suggested that commitment to
such values is sustained by a "sense of Englishness.',6 "Englishness" is
built around a cluster of core beliefs, characterised as the "Protestant
Ethic."? These beliefs, about the value of hard work, delayed
gratification, honesty, social discipline, respectability, etc, are inextricably
• Professor of English Law, University College, London.
IMichael Freeman, "Family Values and Family Justice" (1997) 50 Current Legal Problems
315.
2 The Equality of Women (University of Liverpool Press, Liverpool, 1960).
3 Wachtel v. Wachtel [1973] Fam. 72 at 94, quoted below, is the most overt.
4 See, for example, Peake v. Automative Products Ltd. [1978] Q.B. 233.
5 See R. Wallis, "Moral Indignation and the Media: An Analysis of The National Viewers'
and Listeners' Association" Sociology, vol.lO, pp.271-295.
6 Policing The Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order (Macmillan, 1978).
7 See Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (translated by Talcott
Parsons) (Routledge, 1930).
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bound up with the family, for it is there that these constraints are taught
and generated. Lord Denning oozes traditional Englishness, as a reading
of his Family Story amply testifies.s His opinions on matters relating to
personal life, to women, to the family (as also views on the black
population and Jews9) are very much those of the traditional middle
classes. His views about the equality of women have mellowed, though
they have not matured, since he gave the Eleanor Rathbone Memorial
Lecture in 1960.10 His pronouncements on sexual morality, prudish,
almost prurient, betray "a strong streak of nineteenth-century morality,,,I!
but this is a morality still firmly embedded within the moral centre of
society. Examples are his views on artificial reproductive methods,12 on
pornography (endorsing Raymond Blackburn's viewsl3) and his dissent in
Bravery v. Bravery.14 In this case he expressed the view that a husband
who had a vasectomy without just cause or excuse was striking "at the
very root of the marriage relationship.,,15 He also articulates a view of
family law, seeing it as like the criminal law in that in both regard has to
be had to the "public interest.,,16
Lord Denning has clearly seen himself as a champion of the cause of
women. He believes women have now attained complete equality.17 But
he accepts totally sex-role stereotyping. Thus, writing in 1979, he saw
men and women as occupying separate spheres. IS Nor is it likely that he
would accept the part played by judicial pronouncements in constructing
and defining the order to which he refers. The legal form is one of the
main forms of social practice through which actual relationships
embodying sexual stratification have been expressed. The legal system is
a cultural underpinning of patriarchy. 19 A number of Lord Denning's
judgments can be read in this light. His justification of the resurrection of
the "one-third rule" in Wachtel v. Wachtel is only the best-known example
8 Lord Denning, The Family Story (Butterworths, 1981). His choice of music and literature
(at pp. 249-250) is quintessentially English - and very middle-brow.
9 See The Independent, 17th August, 1990.
10 Supra n.2.
11 Robert Stevens, Law and Politics: The House of Lords As A Judicial Body (Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1979), at p.500.
12 H.L. Deb. vol. 207, col. 943 (26th February, 1958).
13 R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex parte Blackburn (No.3) [1973] 1 Q.B. 241 at
248.
14 [1954] 3 All E.R. 59 (and see H.L. Deb. vol. 206 col. 807 (4th December, 1957)).
IS Ibid at p.68.
16 Idem.
17 The Due Process of Law (Butterworths, 1980), at p.20l.
18 Ibid 194 at p.20l.
19 See M.D.A. Freeman, "Violence Against Women: Does The Legal System Provide
Solutions or Itself Constitute The Problem?" (1980) 7 Br. J. of Law and Soc. 215.
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of this.2o Another is found in the case of Button v. Button. There, he
noted:
"A wife does not get a share in the house simply because
she cleans the walls or works in the garden or helps her
husband with the painting or decorating. Those are the
sorts of things which a wife does for the benefit of the
family without altering the title to or interests in the
property.,,21
It is instructive to compare his reasoning in Button and that in Cooke v.
Head, four years later.22 The case concerned cohabitants: Ms. Cooke did
"quite an unusual amount of work for a woman,,,23 in helping Mr. Head
build a bungalow which was to be their home. In Lord Denning's words:
"she used a sledgehammer to demolish some old buildings.
She filled the wheelbarrow with rubble and hard core and
wheeled it up the bank. She worked the cement mixer
which was out of order and difficult to work. She did
painting and so forth. Miss Cooke did much more than
most women would do.,,24
She had, it seems, the skills of a craftsman.25 What women normally do,
or are expected to do, has, in Lord Denning's eyes, no economic value.
But "real" work must be compensated. Mrs. Button got nothing: Ms.
Cooke's share in the proceeds of sale of the bungalow was increased from
one-twelfth to one-third.
To Lord Denning's way ofthinking, women ought only to acquire rights
in the matrimonial home when they have done something to merit them.
Button v. Button illustrates this: so, in a rather different way, does Gurasz
v. Gurasz?6 The husband and wife jointly owned the matrimonial home,
but the wife left with the four children because of her husband's repulsive
conduct. The wife sought an order that her husband should leave the
matrimonial home. It was granted. The Court of Appeal, however,
rightly held that the order could not be supported on the ground that it was
made. As Lord Denning said, the 1967 Act only protected a wife who had
"no proprietary, contractual or statutory right to remain in the matrimonial
20 Supra n.3.
21 [1968] 1 All E.R. 1064 at 1067.
22 [1972] 2 All E.R. 38.
23 Ibid at pAO.
24 Ibid.
25 Emphasis added.
26 [1969] 3 All E.R. 822.
95
DENNING LAW JOURNAL
home," what he called, somewhat pruriently, a "bare" wife.27 The judge's
order was, however, supported on the ground that an innocent wife has a
personal right to remain in the matrimonial home. Lord Denning
reasoned:
"some features of family life are elemental in our society.
One is that it is the husband's duty to provide his wife with
a roof over her head: .... So long as the wife behaves
herself, she is entitled to remain in the matrimonial
home ..... So long as she has done nothing to forfeit that
right, the court will enforce it.,,28
Lord Denning's conclusion cannot be faulted. But his language is
insensitive. To premise protection upon behaviour is to designate a wife
as having a status similar to a child: we talk of children behaving but not, I
think, wives.
These property cases demonstrate the conditional nature of the rights
Lord Denning is prepared to bestow on women. His is the sort of reform
which improves the position of some women while at the same time
perpetuating the view that domestic labour has no economic value, and
rights generally are dependent on moral proprieties. It is as well to remind
ourselves of this for Lord Denning has often been seen, and has publicised
himself, as in the vanguard of reform. There has been legislative reform
to recognise the value of domestic labour,29 and to preserve maintenance
and accommodation rights after matrimonial misconduct, 30 but these, it
must be stressed, were reforms to reverse trends effectuated by Lord
Denning.
There is hardly an area of modern family law upon which Lord Denning
has not pronounced at some time or other. He sat as a judge in the
Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division for eighteen months in 1944 and
1945. Very few judgments of his of this period are reported. He seems to
have been reversed only onceY His reported judgments of the period do
not throw much light on his values or his methodology. But they show
him to be homely and down-to-earth (sex is described as a "natural and
healthy way of living,,32); prepared to dispose of seemingly binding cases
where they appear to him to lack any rationale;33 with an eye for law
27 Ibid at p.824.
28 Ibid at p.823.
29 Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act, 1970, s.5(1)(f).
30 Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' Courts Act 1978.
31 Churchman v. Churchman [1945] P. 44.
32 Fletcher v. Fletcher [1945] 1All E.R. 582.
33 An example is Norton v. Norton [1945] P. 56.
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reform.34 He also demonstrated the ability to research difficult points of
law: as a result of one such exercise in a case35which demanded that the
principles of collusion be stated, he wrote an article on the subject of
presumptions and burdens which was published in the Law Quarterly
Review.36 There are glimpses also of his pragmatic approach to problems.
"Thank Goodness I only did Divorce for 18 months," he comments on
his brief sojourn in the P.D.A.37 But, ironically, within ten months he was
chairing a committee to inquire into divorce procedure. This was
responsible for reducing the period between decree nisi and absolute, for
the establishment of commissioners to try divorces and for a strengthening
of welfare services in the divorce process.38 He was to emphasise the
importance of reconciliation many times in later cases.39 Between 1948
and 1957 he sat on a large number of appeals in family matters. This is
the time when the deserted wife's equity emerged,40 the notion of "family
assets" was bom,4\ when the courts began to liberalise the bars to
divorce.42 Lord Denning is the progenitor of the first two of these
concepts, and played a major role in the third. One of his earliest reported
forays into family law in the Court of Appeal is Hopes v. Hopes.43 He
recognised the social realities of the housing shortage.
Lord Denning's reputation as the "great dissenter" is not borne out by
the facts in his early years in the Court of Appeal. It was six years before
he dissented in a Court of Appeal case concerned with family matters. By
then he had Bendall v. McWhirter44 and Rimmer v. Rimmer,45 two
breakthrough family property cases, behind him, and in both, as in all
family law cases until Bravery v. Bravery,46 the court was unanimous.
Indeed, it was 1956 before he dissented again, and his conclusion was an
. tl 'bl ~emmen y senSl e one.
34 In Norton v. Norton ibid he disapproves of the way the respondent and correspondent deny
adultery solely to dispute damages and comments "the practice should be changed."
35 Emanuel v. Emanuel [1946] P. 115.
36 "Presumptions and Burdens" (1945) 61 L.Q.R. 379.
37 Supra n.17 at p.189.
38 The product of three reports: Cmd. 6881; Cmd. 6945; and Cmd. 7024.
39 See McTaggart v. McTaggart [1948] P. 94; Simpson v. Simpson [1954] 1 W.L.R. 994;
Richardson v. Richardson [1949] P.16.
40 See Bendall v. McWhirter [1952] 2 Q.B. 466.
4\ See Rimmer v. Rimmer [1953] 1 Q.B. 63.
42 See, e.g., Douglas v. Douglas [1950] P. 85.
43 [1949] P. 227.
44 Supra n.40.
45 Supra n.41.
46 Supra n.14.
47 Jefferson v. Jefferson [1956] P. 136 (the logic of a statutory provision appiicable to large
maintenance payments applied to a small one).
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In his five years in the House of Lords, he had no opportunity to
pronounce in a judicial capacity upon any family law matters. He became
an active member of the legislative branch of the House of Lords.48 Often
his speeches were an affirmation of traditional values including matters
relating to family life and sexual morality.49
By the time he returned to the Court of Appeal as Master of the Rolls he
had established a reputation for dissent and controversy (though Lord
Keith in fact dissented more often).50 He became less cautious, less
concerned with precedent and logical development. Though a
conservative through and through, he committed himself to change, to
right injustice. The paradox is more apparent than real for reform required
the re-establishment of traditional values. A dominant theme running
through Lord Denning's crusades in this period has been to protect the
small man against large organisations, bureaucracies and government
bodies.51 In family law the small man has often been the small woman.
Williams and Glyn's Bank v. Boland is a good illustration of the way Lord
Denning's concern to protect the individual's interests against the power
of large organisations has reflected itself in his family law thinking. 52 The
husband had raised money for his business on the security of the
matrimonial home. The wife had made substantial contributions to its
purchase and was, it was clear, entitled to a share in it. The business
failed, and the bank sought to enforce their charges. The case turned on
whether the wife was in "actual occupation" of the house. To Templeman
J. only the mortgagor (the husband) was: any other view would "lead to
chaos.,,53 The Court of Appeal, Lord Denning very much to the fore,
disagreed. Lord Denning was concerned that: "we should not give
monied might priority over social justice." He reasoned:
"Anyone who lends money on the security of a
matrimonial home ought to realise that the wife may
have a share in it It seems to me utterly wrong that a
lender should tum a blind eye to the wife's interest or the
possibility of it - and afterwards seek to tum her and the
family out - on the plea that he did not know that she was
in actual occupation. If a bank is to do its duty, in the
48 L. Blom-Cooper and G. Drewry, Final Appeal (Clarendon Press,1972), at p.205 show him
to be the most active participant in House of Lords' debates of all eligible judges.
49 See especially his speech reported at H.L. Deb. vol. 207 col. 943 (26th February, 1958).
50 See supra n.48 at p.179: only 16% afLord Denning's judgments were dissents and 22% of
Lord Keith's were.
51 But not consistently so: see R. v. Preston S.B.A. T. ex parte Moore [1975] 1W.L.R. 624.
52 [1979] 2 W.L.R. 550.
53 See Bird v. Syme-Thompson [1979] 1W.L.R. 440 at 444.
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society in which we live, it should recognise the integrity
of the matrimonial home. ,,54
Boland was the 1970s' counterpart to the deserted wife's equity of the
1950s and early 1960s, which the House of Lords extirpated in National
Provincial Bank v. Ainsworth.55 But protection of the wife in Boland
required statutory construction, not judicial intervention. It is not
surprising that the House of Lords upheld Boland.56
Boland is a good illustration of Lord Denning's concerns towards the
end of his time in the Court of Appeal. But it is not an especially good
illustration of his reasoning processes. It is to other family law decisions,
particularly to those of the 1960s and early 1970s, that one must go to
seek these. After the early 1970s, Lord Denning made only occasional
forays into family matters: Boland is one example, Davis v. Johnson was
another.57 Here in his view it was imperative that "social justice
require[d] that personal rights should ... be given priority over rights of
property.,,58 He referred to Tarr v. Tarr59 and National Provincial Bank v.
Ainsworth60 and commented:
"I know that in those two cases the House of Lords
reversed the decisions of this court and gave priority to
property rights. But Parliament in each case afterwards
passed laws so as to restore the decisions of this court. I
prefer to go by the principles underlying the legislative
enactments rather than by the out-dated notions of the
past.,,61
It is noteworthy that on this occasion one member of the House of
Lords, Lord Scarman, picked up Lord Denning's point, noting that "the
restriction or suspension for a time of property rights is a familiar aspect
of much of our social1egislation.,,62
Lord Denning made his major impact on family law in a series of cases
about the ownership of the matrimonial home in the years immediately
after Ainsworth. It would be reading too much into these decisions to say
that they were a direct reaction to the House of Lords' demolition of the
54 Supra n.52 at p.560.
55 [1965] A.C. 1175.
56 [1981] A.C. 487.
57 [1978] 1 All E.R. 841.
58 Ibid at p.849.
59 [19731 A.C. 254.
60 Supra n.55.
6\ Supra n.57 at p.847.
62 [1979] A.C. 264.
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deserted wife's equity, but this might be a plausible interpretation. The
passage of legislation giving judges discretion to transfer property and
vary property interests may have taken the sting out of Lord Denning's
campaign and encouraged him to innovate in other fie1ds.63 Certainly,
after establishing precedents on financial provision and property
adjustment on divorce, in the light of Acts which had, in his language,
"revolutionised the law,,,64he sought other pastures. Boland excepted, his
main interest in the family, as the 1970s developed, really lay in
assimilating wherever possible the consequences of cohabitation to those
of marriage.
But he regretted that, as he put it, the concept of marriage was being
"eroded." His statement in Bernard v. Josephs did not disguise his own
sadness: "Many couples lived together as if they were husband and wife
when they were not married.,,65 In The Due Process of the Law he wrote
that "the only basis for a sound family life is a Christian marriage .... ,,66
The sentiments are congruent with his moral fundamentalism, to which
reference has already been made. With this in mind, his response to
situations where cohabitation has broken down may cause surprise. It
might be expected that he would have adopted the view that the law
should only afford protection and relief to those lawfully married. But
Lord Denning's response - indeed, the judicial response - has been to
treat cohabiting couples like married couples wherever possible.67 The
judiciary has not done this with every relationship outside marriage: only
with those that conform stereotypically to norms associated with marriage.
Thus, the retaining of separate names or separate bank accounts may
induce the courts to treat a relationship as contractual and not to impose
upon it consequences that flow from status.68 The female cohabitant's
behaviour is scrutinised: has she done the sort of things that a married
woman might be expected to do or has she exceeded expectations in some
way (the example of building activities already referred to).69 Her sexual
fidelity is also examined rather as a married woman's was under the old
63 Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970, s.4.
64 Trippas v. Trippas [1973] 2 All E.R. 1 at 4.
65 [1982] 3 All E.R. 162 at 165.
66 Supra n.l7 at p.20!.
67 See, generally, M.D.A. Freeman and C.M. Lyon, Cohabitation Without Marriage (Gower
Press, 1983) chs. 4 and 6.
68 See, e.g., Helby v. Rafferty [1979] 1 W.L.R. 13, not a decision of Lord Denning's.
69 As in Cooke v. Head and Eves v. Eves, see supra n.22 & infra n.76. But see also Smith v.
Baker [1970] 2 All E.R. 826 ("she even helped dig the foundation herself" per Lord Denning
at p.827).
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fault-based law of divorce.7o What superficially looks progressive, on
closer examination is more suspect.
In Cooke v. Head,11 Lord Denning treated an unmarried couple in the
same way as he treated the married in such cases as Hazell v. Hazell,72
n uCracknell v. Cracknell and Hargrave v. Newton.
"It is now held that, whenever two parties by their joint
efforts acquire property to be used for their joint benefit,
the courts may impose or impute a constructive or resulting
trust. The legal owner is bound to hold the property on
trust for them both. This trust does not need any writing.
It can be enforced by an order for sale .... It applies to
husband and wife, to engaged couples, and to man and
mistress, and maybe to other relationships toO.,,75
In Eves v. Eves,76 Cooke v. Head was followed. Lord Denning quoted
his remarks in Cooke v. Head. He referred particularly to the male
cohabitant's conduct: how he gained her confidence and how she trusted
him. He had gained her compliance by a statement that he intended to put
the property into their joint names as soon as it was legally possible. Lord
Denning thought that "he should be judged by what he told her - by what
he had led her to believe - and not by his own intent which he kept to
himself.''?? He also remarked:
"It is clear that her contribution was such that if she had
been a wife she would have had a good claim to have a
share in [the house] on a divorce.,,78
He cited Wachtel v. Wachtel in support.79 In both Cooke v. Head and
Eves v. Eves, the female cohabitant was held to have acquired an interest
by way of a trust. The two cases show the way the courts, with Lord
Denning very much in the vanguard, are developing principles for
70 See Ruth Deech, "The Case Against the Legal Recognition of Cohabitation" (1980) 29
I.C.L.Q. 480.
71 Supra n.22.
72 [1972] 1W.L.R. 301.
73 [1971] P. 356.
74 [1971] 2 All E.R. 1611.
75 Supra n.22 at pAl.
76 [1975] 1W.L.R. 1338.
77 Ibid at p.1342.
78 Idem.
79 Supra n.3.
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drawing inferences from the relationships of cohabitants in much the same
way as they have done in the case of husband and wife.
Having implied a trust, within days, Lord Denning went on to imply a
contract. In Tanner v. Tanner, the male partner had purchased a house for
the defendant and their twin baby daughters.8o She had left her rent-
controlled flat. When the relationship broke down the plaintiff claimed
possession of the house on the basis that the defendant had a bare licence
only, which he had revoked. Lord Denning's riposte was:
"I cannot believe that this is the law. The man had a moral
duty to provide for the babies of whom he was the father. I
would go further. I think he had a legal duty towards them.
Not only towards the babies. But also towards their
mother. She was looking after them and bringing them up.
In order to fulfil this duty towards the babies, he was under
a duty to provide for the mother toO.,,81
A contractual licence was inferred, consideration being found in the
defendant's giving up of her rent-controlled flat. Lord Denning went even
further: the court, he argued, could not only imply a contract but if need
be, impose the equivalent of a contract.82
In Cooke v. Head, the Court of Appeal refused to follow a previous
Court of Appeal decision. They did not say they were doing this but
simply decided the instant case as if the earlier one were not there. Lord
Denning admitted this in Dyson Holdings v. Fox,83another case on
cohabitation, in which he refused to follow Gammans v. Ekins.84 The
previous decision, he said, was "not in accord with modern thinking.,,8s
Lord Denning's judgment in Dyson Holdings v. Fox is a good illustration
of his thinking. The question which arose was whether a seventy-four
year old woman who had lived with a man for twenty-one years, the
cohabitation having terminated on his death some fourteen years earlier,
could be turned out of a house she had occupied for thirty-five years, by a
property company. There was no doubt where Lord Denning's sympathy
lay. She could stay if she were a member of her former cohabitant's
family. Existing case law would have allowed the court so to hold had
they had children.86 But they had not. Lord Denning thought this "a
80 [1975] 3 All E.R. 776
81 Ibid at p.779.
82 Ibid at p.780.
83 [1976] Q.B. 503.
84 [1950] 2 K.B. 328.
85 Supra n.83 at p.509.
86 Hawes v. Evenden [1953] 1W.L.R. 1169.
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ridiculous distinction. So ridiculous, indeed, that it should be rejected by
this court.,,87 So, what was to be done with the previous case law? Lord
Denning had two answers. First, to assert in his grand style that the Court
of Appeal was not bound by previous decisions which, as a result of a
change in social conditions, were not in accord with modem thinking.
And, secondly, to demonstrate, rather deviously, that Gammans v. Ekins
could be disposed of by one of the exceptions laid down in Young v.
Bristol Aeroplane CO.88
Lord Denning made a major contribution to divorce jurisprudence. His
own attitude towards divorce was always ambivalent. He favoured
divorce reform both in 196389and in 1969.90 In his judicial capacity he
enthusiastically embraced the irretrievable breakdown concept.91 On the
other hand, he was clearly fearful of what divorce reform might mean for
the family. Speaking to the Nottingham branch of the Marriage Guidance
Council in 1971 he warned: "It is a time for all good folk to take a stand,
else the permissive society will soon become the decadent society.,,92 His
concerns were apparent in his decisions long before this.93 Thus, in
Kaslefsky v. Kaslefsky in 1950 he stressed that gross neglect and chronic
discord were not yet grounds for divorce:
"If the door of cruelty were opened too wide, we should
soon find ourselves granting divorce for incompatibility of
temperament. That is an easy path to tread ... The
temptation must be resisted lest we slip into a state of
affairs where the institution of marriage itself is
imperilled. ,,94
Lord Denning never liked divorce and always wanted to keep it fIrmly
within bounds. But he took a realistic approach to it. And he was
sometimes ahead of his time. In 1950, he stressed that the divorce court
was concerned not to punish anyone, but to give relief from a marriage
that had broken down.95 He found the concept of mutual desertion
acceptable for much the same reason. Thus, in Beigan v. Beigan, he
stated:
87 Supra n.83 at p.509.
88 [1944] K.B. 718.
89 See H.L. Deb. vol. 250 cols. 405-407.
90 See B.H. Lee, Divorce Reform In England (Peter Owen, 1974) at pp.179-80. But cf his
foreword to W. Latey, The Tide of Divorce (Longman, 1970) at p. vii.
91 See, e.g., Fuller (orse Penfold) v. Fuller [1973] 2 All E.R. 650.
92 The Times, 1st October, 1971.
93 Moor v. Moor [1954] 2 All E.R. 458; Pike v. Pike [1953] P. 38.
94 [1950] 2 All E.R. 398 at 403.
95 Davis v. Davis [1950] P. 125.
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"In many of these cases both are equally to blame for the
breakdown of the marriage and the only just solution is a
decree of divorce on the ground of desertion by each
without drawing any distinction between them.,,96
His pronouncements on reconciliation were also ahead of his time.
Thus, in Richardson v. Richardson in 1949, his view on what conduct
could revive condoned adultery was influenced by considering what
would foster and what frustrate attempts at reconciliation.97 And, in
Simpson v. Simpson in 1954 - an application for leave to petition for
divorce within three years of marriage - he stressed the importance of
looking at the respondent's answer as well as the petitioner's allegations.98
Without so doing, it was difficult to assess the possibility of a
reconciliation between the parties. There is little doubt, though, that Lord
Denning's major contribution to divorce law in these pre-reform days was
the establishment of a civil law test in relation to the proof of matrimonial
offences.99
To each of the old grounds of divorce, the now moribund "facts," Lord
Denning contributed significantly. He heard the first appeal on adultery in
its new guise under the Divorce Reform Act 1969 and held that the two
limbs of section 1(2)(a) were independent, so that the linking "and" was
construed disjunctively. 100 A differently constituted Court of Appeal was
not happy with this conclusion but unprepared to believe that a court
containing Lord Denning and Lord Justice Scarman could have nodded. 101
Lord Denning heard only one reported appeal on "unreasonable
behaviour," the case of Bradley v. Bradley.102 This showed Lord Denning
at his liberal and pragmatic best. A woman continued to live with her
husband because she had a large number of children and nowhere else to
go. There was no doubt that his behaviour (which included violence) was
such that she could not reasonably be expected to live with him. She was
in a "Catch-22" situation: the local authority would rehouse her if she
secured a divorce, but to obtain a divorce did she first have to separate
from her husband? The trial judge took the view that there was no
possibility of a divorce. Lord Denning, however, reasoned:
96 [1956] 2 All E.R. 630 at 632.
97 [1949] P. 16.
98 [1954] 1W.L.R. 994
99 Gower v. Gower [1950] W.N. 156. See also Blyth v. Blyth [1966] A.C. 643.
100 Cleary v. Cleary [1974] 1 All E.R. 498.
101 Carr v. Carr [1974] 3 All E.R. 1193.
102 [1973] 3 All E.R. 750.
104
FAMILY JUSTICE AND FAMILY VALUES
" ... the wife is in fact living with the husband. How can
she say that she 'cannot reasonably be expected to live
with her husband' when she is in fact living with him? I
think she can say so. The section does not go on to provide
that she must have left him and be 'living apart' from him.
It simply says that she 'cannot reasonably be expected to
live with him.' I think she satisfies that requirement, even
though she is in the same house with him - and is in fact
living with him - if it be the case that she has no
alternative open to her - nowhere else to go. It is not
reasonable to expect her to live there, but albeit
unreasonable, she has no option but to be there.',[03
On desertion too Lord Denning made a major contribution. Until Lord
Denning held otherwise, it was the law that a husband had an overriding
right to determine the location of the matrimonial home and a wife who
refused to join him there was said to be in desertion. 104But, in Dunn v.
Dunn, 105he held that it was the party who had "produced the separation by
reason of his or her unreasonable behaviour,,106 that was in desertion. His
other principal contribution to the law of desertion is his judgment in
Hopes v. Hopes.I07 He drew a distinction between desertion on the one
hand and gross neglect and chronic discord on the other. When a couple
were living under the same roof, separation for the purposes of desertion
occurred "when they cease to be one household and become two
households ... ,,108The "one household or two" test has been consistently
invoked ever since.109
Lord Denning's impact on the separation provisions ofthe Divorce
Reform Act 1969 was not great, though his intelligent and expansive
interpretation of what is now section 2(6) of the Matrimonial Causes Act
1973 in Fuller (orse Penfold) v. Fuller should not be overlooked.110 It
undoubtedly gave effect to the policy underlying the five years separation
provision. So did his judgment in Chapman v. Chapman: in a five years
separation petition "it would be contrary to the policy of the legislature
that the court should hold a post-mortem simply to make an award of
costs."! II
103 Ibid at p.752.
104 Mansey v. Mansey [1940] P. 139; King v. King [1942] P. 1.
105 [1948] 2 All E.R. 822.
106 Ibid at p.823.
107 Supra n.43.
108 Ibid at p.236.
109 See Mouncer v. Mouncer [1972] 1 W.L.R. 321.
110 Supra n.91.
III [1972] 3 All E.R. 1089 at 1090.
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Lord Denning's contribution to the law on financial provision after
divorce is considerable. He was one of the first to recognise that a wife
might ask for maintenance even if she was "guilty." He developed the
notion ofthe "compassionate allowance." I 12 He recognised the need to
take account of the wife's earning capacity though he affirmed in the same
case the importance of female dependency ("It does not. .. lie in the mouth
of a wrongdoing husband to say that his wife ought to go out to work
simply in order to relieve him from paying maintenance" I 13). Lord
Denning was one of the earliest judicial advocates of the clean break 1 14
and, once its principle was established, 115 he gave it his support, though
some ambivalence can be detected.I'6 He saw the necessity to treat
financial provision and property adjustment as all of one piece 117 before
legislation in 1970 did just this. But of all his decisions on financial
provision it is Wachtel v. Wachtel for which he will be longest
remembered.118 It is true that it was Ormrod J. in Wachtel who coined the
phrase "obvious and gross" misconduce 19 and Phillimore L.J. in
Ackerman v. Ackermanl20 who re-introduced the one-third rule (whilst
stressing it was not a rule). But Lord Denning's judgment remains the
classical source of these doctrines. Wachtel is also significant for the
stand that Lord Denning takes on lump sum payments. The concept dates
from 1963121 but judges were reluctant to order such payments. Lord
Denning stressed that: "In every case the court should consider whether to
order a lump sum to be paid ... " Of course:
"No order should be made for a lump sum unless the
husband has capital assets out of which to pay it - without
crippling his earning power .... When the husband has
available capital assets sufficient for the purpose, the court
should not hesitate to order a lump sum.,,122
112 See Sydenham v. Sydenham [1949] 2 All E.R. 196; Trestain v. Trestain [1950] P. 198. See
also Williams v. Williams [1957] 1W.L.R. 148 (right to maintenance suspended, not
forfeited, by desertion).
113 Rose v. Rose [1950] 2 All E.R. 311 at 313.
114 Smith v. Smith [1970] 1W.L.R. 155.
115 See Minton v.Minton [1979] A.C. 593.
116 See Dunford v. Dunford [1980] 1 All E.R. 122. See also Jessel v. Jesse! [1979] 3 All E.R.
645.
117 In Button v. Button supra n.21 at p.1067.
118 Supra n.3.
119 [1973] 1 All E.R. 113 at 119.
120 [1972] Fam. 225 at 234.
121 Matrimonial Causes Act 1963 s.5(1).
122 Supra n.3 at pp.95-96.
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He saw it as helping to remove the bitterness so often attendant on
periodical payments. Wachtel ensured that lump sums became common
even if, necessarily, the number of orders is still comparatively small.
Lord Denning only returned to the question once since Wachtel. In
Trippas v. Trippas, he rejected the "suggestion that a lump sum is simply
h f 'f . . ,,123anot er way 0 quanti ymg mamtenance.
Lord Denning's observations on matrimonial misconduct and his
espousal of lump sum payments did much to chart the future, at least the
immediate future, of financial provision and "equitable redistribution,,124
of property on divorce. The same cannot be said of his reactivation of the
discredited notion of the "one-third" rule. But his justification of the rule
will long be remembered:
"When a marriage breaks up, there will thenceforward be
two households instead of one. The husband will have to
go out to work all day and must get some woman to look
after the house - either a wife if he remarries, or a
housekeeper, if he does not. He will also have to provide
maintenance for the children. The wife will not usually
have so much expense. She may go out to work herself,
but she will not usually employ a housekeeper. She will do
most of the housework herself, perhaps with some help.
Or she may remarry, in which case her new husband will
provide for her. In any case, when there are two
households, the greater expense will, in most cases, fallon
the husband rather than the wife. As a start has to be made
somewhere, it seems to us that in the past it was quite fair
to start with one-third.,,125
Lord Denning did not then ask about the present.
Anyone who reads The Due Process of Law will be left in no doubt that
Lord Denning himself thinks his most substantial venture into family law
have been in connection with the matrimonial home. 126As early as 1947
he was protecting deserted wives in the occupation of the matrimonial
home, and claiming that the discretion vested in the judge by section 17 of
the 1882 Act was "in no way fettered, though it must be exercised
judicially."127 It was he who invented the "compendious phrase,,128
123 [1973] Fam. 134 at 140.
124 The term is Ormrod L.J.'s: see O'Donnell v. O'Donnell [1976] Fam. 83.
125 Supra n.3 at p.94.
126 Supra n.17 at part 6.
127 Hutchinson v. Hutchinson [1947] 63 T.L.R. 645.
128 Nixon v. Nixon [1969] 3 All E.R. 1133 at 1137.
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"family assets,,129(the House of Lords subsequently determined the
expression had no legal meaning). 130Lord Denning's response was to
construct a beneficial interest in the matrimonial home by imposing a
trust. 131The problem centred on indirect contributions by the wife to the
family budget. The orthodox view required the indirect contribution to be
directly referable to the acquisition costs, 132but Lord Denning rejected the
need to find such a causal relationship. In his view it was sufficient "if the
contributions made by the wife are such as to relieve the husband from
expenditure which he would otherwise have had to bear.,,133 Lord
Denning was also instrumental in establishing the principle that a wife
may acquire an interest in the matrimonial home by working gratuitously
in her husband's business. 134Another strategy adopted by Lord Denning
to enable a non-estate owner to acquire interest in the matrimonial home is
through effecting improvements to it. 135This led to a statutory
formulation (section 37 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act
1970). He did not disguise his pleasure.
"Note that section 37 is not an alteration of the previous
law. It is a declaration of the law - a declaration of what
the law was before the Act. It aff1rms, therefore, the
decision of this court in Jansen v. Jansen and the
principles adopted by the equitable school.,,136
Lord Denning also did much to protect the occupation in the
matrimonial home of the deserted wife. Her right to stay in the
matrimonial home as against her husband had been established before
Lord Denning became a judge, 137but it was one he embraced
enthusiastically.138 In a series of cases, beginning with Bendall v.
McWhirter in 1952 the courts, with Lord Denning very much in the
129 First used in Cobb v. Cobb [1955] 1 W.L.R. 731 (though he claims in The Due Process of
Law supra n.17 at p.232 that he did so earlier in Rimmer v. Rimmer: the concept is there, but
not the phrase).
130 Pettitt v. Pettitt [1970] A.C.777 and Gissing v. Gissing [1971] A.C. 885.
131 Heseltine v. Heseltine [1971] 1 W.L.R. 342; Hazell v. Hazell supra n.72; Davis v. Vale
[1971] 1 W.L.R. 1022; Cooke v. Head supra n.22.
132 Cowcher v. Cowcher [1972] 1 W.L.R. 425.
L33 Hazell v. Hazell supra n.72 at p.304.
L34 Nixon v. Nixon supra n.128; Muetzel v. Muetzel [1970] 1 W.L.R. 188 (a partnership); Re
Cummins [1971] 3 All E.R. 782.
135 Appleton Vo Appleton [1965] 1 All E.R. 44; Jansen v. Jansen [1965] P. 478; cf Button v.
Button supra n.21.
136 In Davis v. Vale supra n.131 at p.1025.
137 Bramwell v. Bramwell [1942] 1 K.B. 370.
138 In Hutchinson v. Hutchinson supra n.127; Lee v. Lee [1952] 2 Q.B. 489 at 492; and in
Halden v. Halden [1966] 3 All E.R. 412 at 413.
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vanguard, went even further and created, what was known as, the
"deserted wife's equity.,,139 This was one of the boldest creations of the
judiciary in this century. It survived until 1965, when, in National
P . 'lB k A' hJ40"'al 'd . fh . ,,141rovmCla an v. mswort, SOCi consi erations 0 umamty
ceded to justice to third parties and sound principles of real property law.
And this was a catalyst to reform, but Lord Denning was critical of this
reform too. In particular, he spoke against registration of a charge as a
. . • 142pre-reqmsite to protection.
Lord Denning was also involved in a large number of decisions relating
to children. Many of them are important, even if not recognised as such
when they were decided. Most significant is the earliest case to move
away from a presumption of reasonableness in withholding consent to
adoption and to substitute an objective test in determining whether the
parent's refusal is reasonable. Lord Denning said:
"A reasonable mother surely gives great weight to what is
better for the child. Her anguish of mind is quite
understandable; but still it may be unreasonable for her to
withhold consent. We must look and see whether it is
reasonable or unreasonable according to what a reasonable
woman in her place would do in all the circumstances of
the case."J43
These remarks were accepted as "authoritative" by Lord Hailsham in
the leading case of Re W (an infant) in 1971 and Lord Denning's 1962 test
. h d 144remams t e test to ay.
Lord Denning participated also in one ofthe earliest children's rights
cases (Hewer v. Bryant).145 His description of the parental right to
physical possession of children as a "dwindling" one which starts "with a
right of control and ends with little more than advice" remains
memorable.146 There is here a nascent recognition of a child's autonomy.
In several cases his concern for a child's welfare can be detected. 147Not
surprisingly, Lord Denning's views on the family and his traditionalism
139 Supra n.55.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid at p.1242 per Lord Wilberforce.
142 H.L. Deb. vol. 275 col. 44 (14th June, 1966).
143 Re L [1962] 106 S.J. 611
144 [1971] A.C. 682
145 [1970] 1Q.B. 357.
146 Ibid at p.369. See also B (BR) v. B (J) [1968] P. 466.
147 For example, Re S (an infant) [1965] 1W.L.R. 865. See also Surrey c.c. v. S [1974] Q.B.
124.
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are reflected in decisions in child law matters. Thus, in Re L, he denied an
adulterous mother custody.
"It would be an exceedingly bad example if it were thought
that a mother could go off with another man and then claim
as of right to say: 'Oh well, they are my two little girls and
I am entitled to take them with me. I can not only leave
my home and break it up and leave their father, but I can
take the children with me and the law will not say me nay.'
It seems to me that a mother must realise that if she leaves
and breaks up her home in this way she cannot as of right
demand to take the children from the father.,,148
It is significant that twice in this judgment he uses the expression "as of
right," and that he went on to refer to the case as "a matter of simple
justice" between mother and father. The matter should have been
characterised, as it is now, as one concerned with children's welfare. 149
Lord Denning's determination to punish a "loose woman" got the better of
him, rather as it was to do in the notorious Bradford Teachers' Training
College case. 150 Other decisions, though less striking, nourish similar
notions about family life. Thus, in W v. Wand C, he asserted the "general
principle" that it was better for a boy of eight to be with his father than
with his mother, even if he had been brought up by his mother until
h 15] Th' d' d f 152t en. ISwas soon Isapprove o.
He both extended and narrowed wardship jurisdiction. In Re P (GE)
(infant) he held that the court had jurisdiction in respect of a stateless alien
minor, who though not present in the jurisdiction would be said to be
"ordinarily resident" in England. 153There was some authority in the law
of treason for saying that an alien resident could owe allegiance even
though he was outside the country, but, if the analogy is tenuous, Lord
Denning was not deterred from making law. ]54 He commented:
"We are not deterred by the absence of authority in the
books. Our forefathers always held that the law was
148 [1962] 3 All E.R. 1 at 3-4.
149 S (BD) v. S (DJ) [1977] Fam. 109 and Re K [1977] Fam. 179.
150 Ward v. Bradford Corporation [1972] 70 L.G.R. 27 at 35.
151 [1968] 1W.L.R. 1310
152 In Re C (A) (an infant) [1970] 1 All E.R. 309
153 [1965] Ch. 568.
154 Joyce v. D.P.P. [1946] A.C. 347.
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locked in the breasts of the judges ready to be unlocked
whenever the need arose." 1 5
But Lord Denning cut down the ambit of the protective jurisdiction on at
least three occasions: in each the public interest was involved. In S v.
McC,156 a paternity dispute, the interests of justice prevailed over the
interests of the child; in Re A (an infant), 157 the integrity of immigration
decisions was protected from surveillance by means of wardship; and in
Re X (a minor), 158 freedom of publication (which could cause an
adolescent gross psychological damage) was said to override any interests
the child might have. All three decisions are consistent with authority,
and each has since been followed.159
Since Lord Denning's retirement family law has seen major changes and
we can but speculate how he would have reacted. He would clearly have
approved of child support legislation and the sentiments of the Family
Law Act 1996 (its mediation provisions were presaged by his own
recommendations nearly half a century earlier). Whether he would be as
happy with the very different policies of the Children Act 1989 is less
likely.
A study of Lord Denning's family law decisions throws light on much
besides the law itself. We learn about his working personality and his
thinking processes. And his decisions in family matters are a microcosm
of his concerns elsewhere. They reveal Lord Denning at his most typical.
His populist sense of justice may lead to some indefensible decisions and
some wayward reasoning and also to some inconsistency. But, on the
whole, the real good he has done outweighs any injustices he has caused.
Without Lord Denning family law would have been more rigid and less
sensitive; more oriented to rights than to needs and welfare and the
interests ofthe weak. It would also be less committed to the patriarchy.
The contradictions remain: a harbinger of, and catalyst for, reform and at
the same time a bastion of reaction. It is unnecessary to resolve these
conflicts: Lord Denning is, and will remain, a living paradox.
155 Supra n.53 at p.583
156 [1970] 1 W.L.R. 483 (though not a wardship case, it may be treated as such since the
p.rinciples are identical).
57 [1968] 2 All E.R. 149.
158 [1975] Fam. 47.
159 See in general A v. Liverpool City Council [1982] A.C. 363.
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